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The paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism about matters of taste, 
defending a specific form of contextualism. It is first considered whether the disagreement 
data might manifest an inviariantist attitude speakers pre-reflectively have. Semantic and 
ontological enlightenment should then make the impressions of disagreement vanish, or at 
least leave them as lingering ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but it is granted to 
relativists that this does not fully happen. López de Sa’s appeal to presuppositions of 
commonality and Sundell’s appeal to metalinguistic disagreement are discussed, and it is 
argued that, although they help to clarify the issues, they do not fully explain why such 
impressions remain under enlightenment. To do it, the paper develops a suggestion that 
other writers have made, that the lingering impression of disagreement is a consequence of 
a practical conflict, appealing to dispositions to practical coordination that come together with 
presuppositions of commonality in axiological matters. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Consider the following exchange between two seasoned, reflective food appreciators. 
They have refined their tastes by training as much as one can expect, and have considered 
the matter in optimal circumstances for appraisal. Let us assume further that only food 
appreciation is at stake in their evaluation of restaurants: 
Noma1 A: Noma is a better restaurant than Mugaritz. 
 B: Noma is not a better restaurant than Mugaritz; Mugaritz is better. 
People feel that A and B disagree.1 Now, on contextualist accounts of the semantics of 
predicates of taste the claims are equivalent to these: 
Noma2 A: Noma is a better restaurant than Mugaritz given A’s present standard. 
 B: Noma is not a better restaurant than Mugaritz given B’s present standard. 
There is however no impression of disagreement about Noma2. As Kölbel (2004) points 
out, unlike in Noma1 in Noma2 both critics can rationally accept what the other has said 
while sticking to their respective assertions. These contrasting impressions persist if, instead 
of taking A and B to be in a common conversation, we think of them as making independent 
judgments. This shows that the felt disagreement does not just concern an activity – 
engaging in a disagreement – but more fundamentally a state – being in disagreement 
(Cappelen & Hawthorne 2009, 60-1).2 In Noma1, A and B appear to disagree because it 
seems that they cannot both be right, whether or not they actively engage in a discussion. 
We may call the kind of disagreement that appears to exist here a doxastic disagreement: 
the relation between two agents that holds when they cannot both be right in their expressed 
beliefs. 
Note that these are first-personally committed uses (Egan 2010, 251), to be distinguished 
from sympathetic uses in which we ascribe tastes by adopting alien perspectives (‘that cat 
                                                
1 Sarkissian et al. (2011) review previous empirical work corroborating this claim, and 
present new data somehow challenging it; we discuss their data below.  
2 Cf. Marques (2014a) for a discussion of the nature of disagreement. 
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food must be delicious’),3 without thereby committing ourselves to the practical 
consequences that typically follow from claims such as those in Noma1 (e.g., A’s preferring 
an invitation to Noma to one to Mugaritz, ceteris paribus). 
Contextualist views are classified as relativist (cf. Harman (1975) and Dreier (1999)), for 
according to them the predicates only have denotation relative to evaluative standards. 
Following recent trend, let us classify them as forms of indexical relativism. Several writers 
have argued for alternative semantic proposals, forms of truth-relativism, mainly on the basis 
that indexical relativism misses intuitions of disagreement like those in Noma1. Thus, Kölbel 
(2004) argues on this basis for what we will call moderate (truth-)relativism; and Egan (2010), 
Lassersohn (2005) and McFarlane (2014) have argued for another version that we will call 
assessor relativism.  
The difference between the two forms of truth-relativism is this. On traditional semantic 
assumptions, the semantic contents of sentences determine truth-values relative to possible 
worlds. As Kaplan (1989, 503-4) puts it, contents are modally neutral – the same content is 
expressed by a sentence uttered in different worlds. For relativists, semantic contents 
determine truth-values relative not just to possible worlds, but also to further parameters 
(standards of taste, in the present case): unlike standard-specific contextualist contents, they 
are standard-neutral. For moderate relativists, the evaluation of acts such as assertions or 
judgments with those contents remains absolute. In the same way that the context in which a 
statement is made provides a specific value for the world-parameter, the context also 
provides fixed values for the additional parameters (here, a standard of taste intended by the 
subject making the statement). Assessor relativism is a more radical proposal, on which the 
evaluation of the statement itself remains relative. The values for the standard-of-taste 
parameter are given by contexts where the statement is assessed for truth or falsity, which 
need not be any standards that the speaker might have intended.4  
                                                
3 Other writers follow Stephenson (2007) in speaking of ‘autocentric’ vs. ‘exocentric’ uses. 
4 Evans (1983) contemplates the distinction between moderate and assessor relativism (in 
his terms, T2/T3, vs. T1). He points out that the “moderate” varieties are just semantic 
proposals which should be accepted or rejected on the basis of semantic evidence, and 
contends that T1 (assessor relativism) is something else altogether, which prima facie is 
subject to a very serious a priori objection. Evans is very brief in stating the objection. 
Marques (2014b) elaborates on it, along these lines: if assessor relativism is to be 
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López de Sa (2008) has offered an account of the disagreement data compatible with 
contextualism, by appealing to presuppositions of commonality. In this paper, we want to 
confront the disagreement argument and defend a specific form of contextualism along 
related lines. In the next section, we consider the possibility that the disagreement data 
manifests an invariantist stance we pre-reflectively have. Semantic and ontological 
enlightenment should then make the impressions vanish, or at least leave them as lingering 
ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but we grant to relativists that this does not entirely 
happen. In the third and fourth sections we discuss different but related contextualist 
accounts of the data, López de Sa’s (2008) account on the one hand and García-
Carpintero’s (2008) and Sundell’s (2011) appeal to metalinguistic disagreement on the other, 
to see whether they might explain the lingering impression of disagreement. We argue that, 
although they help to clarify the issue, they do not fully explain why such impressions remain 
under enlightenment. In order to account for this, we develop in the fifth section a little further 
a suggestion other writers have made on behalf of contextualism, that the lingering 
impression of disagreement is a consequence of a practical conflict that often exists in these 
cases (Jackson & Pettit 1998, 251; Dreier 1999, 568; Huvenes 2012, 178). We will appeal to 
dispositions to practical coordination that, we suggest, come together with presuppositions of 
commonality when axiological matters are at stake. 
The disagreement argument is a main consideration for the recent forms of relativism. It is 
not casual that MacFarlane (2014) begins with a chapter devoted to deploying it against 
alternative views focusing on the case of taste predicates. We hope to contribute to the 
ongoing literature by making clear the complexity of the data needed to properly confront the 
argument. We will show how the initial appeal of both relativist proposals and criticisms of 
non-relativist views depends on ignoring that complexity. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
normatively distinct from moderate relativism, then speakers should be obligated to retract 
when their standards change in relevant ways. But speakers are not under any such 
obligation: it is perfectly rational for reflective and sincere speakers not to accept the 
commitments that assessor relativism saddles on them. 
5 
2. The relat ional ist v iew of tastes  
There are compelling reasons, we think, in favor of a relationalist metaphysical account of 
the nature of the properties expressed by ‘is funny’, ‘is tasty’ or ‘is a good restaurant’, of the 
kind articulated by Cohen (2009) for the case of colors. On Cohen’s view, predicates like 
‘red’ signify relational properties like being sister of b, more specifically “response-
dependent” ones such as looking red to subjects of kind S under circumstances C. A similar 
claim applies to taste predicates, but following usual practice we will speak of relations to a 
standard of taste. Cohen’s Pyrrhonian “master argument” for such a view notes first that a 
single color stimulus can produce multiple, psychophysically distinguishable perceptual 
effects in respect of color, and argues that there is no well-motivated reason for considering 
just one of those variants veridical. Corresponding considerations offer, mutatis mutandis, 
the main reason to take taste properties to be relational: Noma1 is a case in point.  
As Cohen suggests, this metaphysical view can be given a contextualist semantic 
implementation. Uttered in context K, predicates like ‘is red’ or ‘is tasty’ express properties 
such as red for the perceivers relevant in context K under the perceptual circumstances 
relevant in context K or tasty for the standard relevant in K.5 Given certain empirical 
preconditions, however, the relationalist ontology is compatible with an invariantist 
semantics. The precondition is that there is enough uniformity in the relevant human 
responses in sufficiently well defined situations, or at the very least in the responses of the 
group of language-users. If this obtained, it would be appropriate to take the predicates to 
invariantly denote across contexts that relational property, at least when used to predicate it 
                                                
5 ‘Red’ is context-dependent in a different way: which surface of a three-dimensional object 
is to be taken into consideration for an application is contextually given. Something similar 
may apply to taste predicates, cf. Lasersohn’s (2011) proposal to deal with Cappelen & 
Hawthorne’s (2009, 109) examples such as assertions and denials of ‘the party/Summer will 
be fun’ said with respect of different “sides” of the party/Summer. There are at least two well-
developed ways to implement this context dependence. Rothschild & Segal (2009) take the 
predicates themselves to behave like demonstratives; alternatively, they could be 
semantically relational predicates with one or more hidden variables, which might be 
projected in the syntax, as in Szabó (2001). Relationalism might also incorporate these 
proposals. 
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of a given object in a public setting.6 (In contrast, say, to the case in which a non-standard 
subject privately judges it to apply to a given object.) Schafer (2011) argues for such an 
invariantist view mostly for aesthetic predicates, but also for ‘tasty’ and ‘delicious’.  
Although Schafer makes a good case for the invariantist view, we do not think, however, 
that it ultimately succeeds. He might be right (2011, 285) that there is a widespread 
agreement among human beings on matters of taste about some basic sorts of things, 
explainable for evolutionary reasons. Nevertheless, our standards are determined by cultural 
and personal idioLewissyncrasies to a very important degree.7 As a result, for many entities 
in the domain – say, raw whale blubber for breakfast, to use an example of MacFarlane’s 
(2014, XXX) – the empirical precondition would fail, and, under a natural semantic option (the 
one Schafer favors) the invariantist predicates would fail to have a determinate denotation. 
Because of this, we subscribe instead a contextualist semantics, along lines of Schaffer’s 
(2011).8 
                                                
6 We will be putting aside controversies about semantic content. We aim to what is said in 
cases in which no obvious form of non-literalness or indirection is involved – what Relevance 
theorists take typically to be “explicatures” resulting from modulation or Indexicalists contents 
expressed with the help of hidden variables. 
7 Research about the evolution of taste and disgust, the education of taste, and eating 
customs, illustrates this. As humans, we have a vast menu to choose from, but also a much 
higher risk of consuming poisonous and otherwise dangerous substances. We have evolved 
gustatory taste as a reaction to potentially edible things. According to Rozin (1996) and 
Rozin and Fallon (1987), disgust is the fear of incorporating an offending substance into 
one’s body. Disgusting things are, mostly, those coming from animals (in particular, some 
animal parts, like tongues and other internal organs). But it seems there is a wide variability 
in what is found disgusting (and conversely, tasty) from culture to culture, which suggests 
that there is a crucial learning period. Elizabeth Cashdan (1994) argues that there is indeed a 
sensitive period for learning about food in the first two to three years of a child’s life. After 
three years, coinciding with growing independence, children’s tastes diminish drastically. 
Coordinating eating habits with those of the immediate group may be one of the first 
requirements for survival. 
8 On Schaffer (2011, 192) contextualist account, the lexical semantics of taste predicates 
involves a covert variable argument, which is interpreted in context as referring “to either (i) 
7 
How should the relationalist ontology be understood, as a descriptive proposal or rather 
as a revisionary one? Cohen (2009, 146-150) tentatively advances a descriptive 
interpretation for the color case. He correctly points out that the folk show some awareness 
of the main motivation for relationalism about colors, and notes methodological concerns 
about appeals to folk intuitions and phenomenological data to settle matters of constitution. 
Nonetheless, the existence of strong “intuitions of disagreement” – like those in Noma1 for 
taste predicates – can be taken to show that, even if some folks are informed of the reasons 
for relativizing color and taste predicates, that information does not penetrate the source of 
their most immediate, pre-reflexive intuitions.9 By taking those intuitions as indicators of the 
meaning of lexical items, we get an error theory: predicates of taste denote non-instantiated 
absolute, invariant properties. This is just the view that philosophers like Schafer reflectively 
defend – in a much more elaborated way than can be ascribed to our folk intuitions.10  
                                                                                                                                                   
the speaker, via a covert de se pronoun (PRO), or (ii) the typical person, via a covert generic 
pronoun (PROARB)”. (He (2011, 184) allows for other technical possibilities to implement the 
proposal. Moltmann (2010) provides an elaboration of the generic interpretation.) Schaffer 
appeals to several linguistic tests to justify this (ibid., 191-201). Thus, the licensing test is 
based on the observation that taste predicates (unlike predicates like ‘tall’ or ‘sharp’) allow for 
prepositional phrases such as ‘(tasty) to me’. The binding test appeals to the existence of 
bound readings of sentences such as ‘everyone got something tasty’. We cannot go into the 
debates that these tests have generated; we just mention that, as Schaffer himself notes, an 
invariantist like Schafer can argue that such prepositional phrases are not-mandatory 
adjuncts, as opposed to arguments. Besides, bare ascriptions could be always understood to 
include the covert generic pronoun and to be set to the standards of the typical person, in 
accordance with the sort of invariantist view that Schafer (2011) defends. 
9 Of course, relativists offer an alternative account of the intuitions, but in the global balance 
we take relativist proposals not to be an option, and as a result we give their account no 
credit, on the basis of considerations that in this paper we have mostly consigned to 
footnotes. 
10 Assuming Schaffer’s contextualist semantics, we could explain the (mistaken) impressions 
of doxastic disagreement in cases such as Noma1 by interpreting speakers as setting the 
value of the variable to the generic interpretation. But the proponent of an invariantist 
8 
Alternatively, following a familiar line on natural kind terms, it could be argued that what all 
relevant intuitions indicate is that predicates of taste are intended to signify natural 
properties, and that it turns out that the natural properties providing the closest fit are 
contextually variable relational ones. On this proposal, the folk’s mistake manifested in the 
impressions of disagreement would be a form of (exculpable) semantic ignorance.11 The 
actual semantics of the predicates would be contextualist. We will not distinguish further 
between these two different sorts of error ascribed to the folk by the suggestion that the 
mistaken impressions of disagreement reflect invariantist assumptions. 
Even if an error theory were preferable regarding folks’ assumptions about the meanings 
that taste predicates in fact have, as Cohen (2009, 150-1) points out, this would not at all be 
worrying. As in the analogous case of the relativization of temporal expressions such as 
‘duration’ or ‘simultaneity’ mandated by the true theory about space-time,12 the true 
relational metaphysics of colors does provide real, actually instantiated properties. Hence, 
many claims that folks make can be interpreted as correct with respect to such true 
metaphysics of color. The point equally applies to matters of taste. 
MacFarlane (2014) provides some reasons to question the ascription of error to our pre-
reflective folk intuitions just contemplated. He (2014, XXX) argues that ascriptions of taste 
predicates are governed by the following principle: 
TP If you know first-hand how something tastes, call it ‘tasty’ just in case its flavor is 
pleasing to you, and ‘not tasty’ just in case its flavor is not pleasing to you. 
Cf. also Schafer’s (2011, 273) related “second-order norms”: “When your response to 
some work of art is R, all other things being equal, form belief B about this work of art”. Note 
that Schafer’s “all else being equal” or ceteris paribus clause is implicit in MacFarlane’s 
                                                                                                                                                   
semantics would then ask why speakers do not revise this initial assumption, so that the 
impression goes away. 
11 We have decided to replace the phrase “semantic blindness”, common in the literature, 
with “semantic ignorance” – which is equally apt descriptively, and is non-ableist. 
12 Implausibly, Pinillos (2011) defends a version of MacFarlane’s assessment-relativism for 
those expressions. We find such move unwarranted for the Evans-related reasons outlined in 
a previous footnote, and unnecessary given the eminently sensible error-theoretic 
alternative. 
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knowledge condition in TP. Minimally reflective thinkers are aware that there are situations 
under which their responses are not good indicators of whether or not things are tasty or 
beautiful. On MacFarlane’s suggestion, these are cases in which the response does not 
provide knowledge of the real taste, so that TP’s antecedent is not met. Now, as Schafer 
argues and MacFarlane accepts, given this caveat TP is an epistemic principle compatible 
with invariantism: we deploy similar principles for perceptual predicates. MacFarlane (2014, 
XXX) argues that our intuitions manifest important disparities with them, for instance when it 
comes to reactions to peer disagreement or testimony. Schafer (2011, 281-4) replies that the 
differences are smaller than MacFarlane makes them seem, and can in any case be 
explained without giving up invariantism. One might agree with Schafer when it comes to 
describe how taste predicates are understood, even if, as we have indicated, one disagrees 
with him about how they should be. 
MacFarlane also complains that, given TP, the invariantist view ascribes to the folk either 
chauvinism or overconfidence in their capacity to discern how things taste to the typical 
person, which is unwarranted by the available facts of taste disagreement. But, first, given 
that this is a chauvinism or overconfidence endorsed by reflective philosophers, it cannot be 
so out of the question to ascribe it to our intuitions. Second MacFarlane grants that 
sometimes ‘tasty’ simply means (both on invariantist and contextualist views) tasty to me 
now, so, in any particular case, if challenged, one can take that retreat.  
Linguists such as Lasersohn (2005) and Stephenson (2007) report “exocentric” uses, as 
in the following example from von Fintel that Stephenson reports: John, watching his cat 
enjoying cat food, utters, ‘the cat food must be tasty’. But John of course might find such food 
disgusting. Examples like this manifest awareness of the basis for the relationalist 
metaphysics (of which we agree that minimally reflective speakers are aware, at least in 
cases like ‘is tasty’). Does this question the error-theoretic hypothesis we are considering? 
We do not think so. Linguistic recourses include the distinction between ‘it is tasty’ and ‘it is 
tasty to X’ (whether ‘to X’ be an argument or an adjunct), and hence a measure of sensitivity 
to the facts. But this by itself does not question the possibility of an invariantist understanding 
of ‘is tasty’. Moreover, examples like von Fintel’s might involve a sort of pretense. John might 
well go on: ‘but, of course, it is really disgusting’. 
10 
Sarkissian et al. (2011) present evidence that also appears to gainsay the modest form of 
semantic error the present hypothesis uses to interpret our intuitions.13 They suggest that 
previous results establishing invariantist folk intuitions can be accounted for by the fact that 
relevant disparities in the judges were not made salient. By the same token, they suggest, 
people might feel that one of A and B must be wrong when A asserts ‘January is a Winter 
month’ and B rejects it, simply because the possibility that A lives in Canada and B in 
Australia has not been made salient to them; the impression would vanish when it is.  
They investigated whether people feel that at least one of the following two judgments is 
wrong: A’s judgment that an action (say, stabbing a passersby to test the sharpness of a new 
knife) is wrong and B’ judgment that it is permissible, when these three conditions are made 
salient: (i) A and B belong to the same contemporary Western culture; (ii) A as in (i), but B 
belongs to an Amazon tribe that has preserved a traditional warrior culture; (iii) A as in (i), 
and B is an extraterrestrial with a different sort of psychology, not interested in friendship or 
love but just on increasing the total number of equilateral pentagons in the universe. They 
found that their subjects (for whose culture they controlled, studying first university students 
in the US and then in Singapore) strongly agreed (mean 5,5 in a scale from 1 = fully disagree 
to 7= fully agree) that one of A and B’s judgments must be wrong when the issue was factual 
(say, whether pasta is made of flour and water, or rather grows in trees), and also in the first 
condition. However, they tended to disagree (mean 3,2) in the third condition, and were 
doubtful in the second (mean 4,4). 
The results of these experiments, however, do not provide good indicators about the 
dispositional basis for the unreflective judgments constituting the disagreement intuitions 
invoked in the debate confronting contextualists and truth-relativists. Imagine that we ask the 
same university students whether at least one of the following two judgments is wrong: A’s 
judgment that events a and b are simultaneous, and B’s judgment that they are not, making it 
salient that A’s and B’s judgments concern different spatiotemporal frames of reference. We 
doubt that the mean of agreement with the claim that at least one of the judgments is wrong 
would be very high. But this would at most witness the scientific culture of the subjects, not 
                                                
13 They discuss moral predicates, but, on the one hand, we assume that their discussion 
applies to predicates of taste; on the other, although we prefer to avoid discussing predicates 
of moral evaluation here, it would be natural to extent to them our proposals. Cohen (op. cit., 
148-9 reports similar experiments with color predicates conducted with Shaun Nichols. 
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the pre-reflective dispositions they share with not-so-well-informed speakers vis-à-vis ‘being 
simultaneous with’. Similarly, the proponent of the invariantist semantics might suggest, the 
results of the described experiments merely manifest the extent of moral relativist 
sensitivities. It would not be advisable to conclude just from them that there is an indexical for 
frame of reference or moral standards hidden in the subjects’ corresponding lexical entries.  
 
 
3. Commonali ty Presupposit ions and Challenges from Disagreement 
 
López de Sa (2008) has defended indexical relativism from criticisms based on 
disagreement data, by pointing out that the proper semantic implementation of the proposal 
should envisage some presuppositions of commonality that assertions expressing judgments 
of taste should carry. According to him, the failure of these presuppositions accounts for the 
data, but Baker (2012) disputes López de Sa’s proposal. López de Sa’s proposal will later 
play a role on our own, and because of that we want to examine Baker’s criticism. When 
appraising the issue, it will be relevant whether we take indexical relativism to be a 
descriptive (as López de Sa appears to believe) or a revisionary proposal along the lines 
envisaged in the previous section.  
In our view, López de Sa grants too much to intuitions of faultlessness, and as a result he 
discusses a too subjectivist version of indexical relativism. As Cappelen & Hawthorne (2009, 
ch. 4) point out, relativists are too quick to invoke data of the sort of Noma1 against indexical 
relativism, in fact betraying a too simplistic conception of these disputes that then jeopardizes 
their own proposals.14 As we indicated above, even minimally reflective speakers would 
distinguish ‘is tasty’, ‘is fun’ or ‘is a good restaurant’ from ‘feels tasty to me now’, ‘entertains 
me now’ or ‘provides me with a satisfying gustatory experience now’. Relationalist accounts 
capture this by ascribing to the former predicates (‘is tasty’) in default contexts a relation 
between objects and experiences like those expressed by the latter (‘feels tasty to me now’), 
caused under certain circumstances in a plurality of subjects sharing some relevant features. 
As a result, those predications have in default contexts such as the one in Noma1 both 
dispositional and generic features. This allows for a measure of ignorance and error, and 
hence for straightforward doxastic disagreement. When informed about the reasons for a 
                                                
14 The nuanced discussion by Egan (2010) is an outstanding exception.  
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relational view of taste properties, we are aware that things that are in fact tasty or fun may 
not feel so (and the other way round) under certain personal or external circumstances. We 
are thereby prone to engage in arguments on that basis.  
Nonetheless, the indexical relativist acknowledges that there must be cases of pointless 
disputes, in which the subjects are in fact (and perhaps even are aware of) deploying 
contrasting sensibilities and thereby either expressing different relational properties – or 
wrongly purporting to express an inexistent one shared by both of them. Otherwise, the view 
would not be a genuine form of relativism. We have selected Noma1 as an example of such 
a case of a “faultless” dispute – hence, on our view, one not involving any real doxastic 
disagreement, since it’s not the case that they can’t be both right15 How should the indexical 
contextualist react to lingering intuitions of disagreement with respect to such cases? 
López de Sa (2008, 304-5) appeals to an explanation in terms of presuppositions of 
commonality, on which taste predicates “trigger the presupposition that the participants in the 
conversation are similar” in the relevant standard. López de Sa assumes a Stalnakerian 
account of presuppositions as requirements on the “common ground” (the class of 
propositions that participants in the conversation take to be known by all, known to be known 
by all, and so on), which may be triggered by specific expressions or constructions. 
Utterances carrying presuppositions are not felicitous unless the common ground does 
indeed include them, or, if it does not, they are “accommodated” by the conversational 
participants, i.e., included in the common ground as a result of the utterance.16 Impressions 
of disagreement about Noma1 are then explained in that “in any non-defective conversation 
… it would indeed be common ground” that the participants are relevantly alike, and then one 
                                                
15 Schafer (2011) offers an epistemic account of the “faultlessness” intuition consistent with 
his invariantist view. He suggests that aesthetic judgments are guided by second-order 
norms (described above) requiring thinkers to project their aesthetic reactions into aesthetic 
judgments under adequate circumstances. He then argues that, while invoking these norms 
on the basis of our own sensibilities in making judgments, we might be aware that other 
thinkers with different sensibilities invoke the same norm with disparaging results.  
16 Included in a way that still distinguishes presuppositions from assertoric contents. One of 
us has in fact argued (cf. García-Carpintero 2013) that Stalnaker’s reductive view cannot 
properly account for this, and has argued for an account of presuppositions closer to the one 
assumed by theorists in the “Dynamic Semantics” tradition. We will come back to this below. 
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would be right and the other wrong. Of course, the presupposition fails in the Noma1 case, 
and as a result both claims are infelicitous. 
Baker (2012) criticizes this proposal. He invokes three commonly accepted tests for 
presuppositions, and points out that they do not appear to support López de Sa’s claims. Let 
us first consider von Fintel’s (2004, 271) hey, wait a minute test. Cleft constructions such as 
‘it was John who infected the PC’ carry the presupposition that someone infected the PC. 
This is shown in that, while it does not feel proper to object to the assertoric content as in (2), 
it feels adequate to object to the presupposition as in (3): 
(1) It was not John who infected the PC. 
(2) # Hey, wait a minute, I had no idea that John did not infect the PC.17 
(3) Hey, wait a minute, I had no idea that someone infected the PC. 
It is not felicitous to object to the assertoric content with the hey, wait a minute, I had no idea 
construction because such a content is precisely intended to be news to the audience. But it 
is appropriate to object in that way to the presupposition, because it is taken to be 
information already possessed by participants in the conversation. In so doing, we signal our 
unwillingness to accommodate the presupposition. As Baker points out, however, this does 
not fit López de Sa’s proposed presupposition: 
(4) A: Noma is a better restaurant than Mugaritz. 
  B: #? Hey, wait a minute, I had no idea that we shared taste standards. 
Further tests for presuppositions are illustrated for the clef construction in (5) and (6): 
(5) # It was not John who infected the PC; and what is more, someone infected the PC. 
(6) # I have no idea whether someone infected the PC, but it was not John who infected 
it. 
The and what is more test can be justified along the lines of the hey, wait a minute test: it 
hardly makes sense to purport to convey as additional information something that was 
already assumed to be known. (6) shows that attempts to cancel presuppositions make for 
                                                
17 We use ‘#’ to signal infelicity not necessarily grammatical. 
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awkward discourses.18 Again, alleged presuppositions of commonality do not fit the pattern, 
even though, as before in (4), to us at least the following speeches sound a bit peculiar: 
(7) A: ? Noma is a better restaurant than Mugaritz; and what is more, we share taste 
standards. 
(8) A: ? I have no idea whether we share taste standards, but Noma is a better 
restaurant than Mugaritz.  
In previous examples, presuppositions have their source in the linguistic properties of 
some expressions or constructions, and this is the way López de Sa thinks of 
presuppositions of commonality. Presuppositions might also have a purely contextual 
(“pragmatic”) source, as when a foreign colleague e-mails us the day after the 2012 
Champions League final: ‘surely you celebrated long into the night’. Here he is presupposing 
that Chelsea won the Champions, that we are happy about it, that we are interested in 
football, etc. Although these presuppositions are not signaled by lexical properties of the 
expressions that he uses, we somehow infer them through Gricean conversational 
mechanisms. However, the tests also apply to these purely pragmatic cases, and thus López 
de Sa cannot reply to Baker by revising his assumption about the source of the alleged 
commonality presuppositions: 
(9) Hey, wait a minute, I had no idea that there was something to celebrate last night. 
(10) ?# Surely you celebrated long into the night; and what is more, Chelsea won the cup. 
                                                
18 There are contexts where nothing wrong would be felt with related utterances, as shown 
in the literature on presupposition “disappearance” or “cancellation”, as in the following 
variation on an example originally given by Keenan (1971): “You say that somebody infected 
the PC. It was not me who infected it, it was not Mary who infected it, it was not John who 
infected it … in fact, I do not know that anybody infected the PC”. Given that the 
presuppositions of clefts are, we think, conventionally triggered (more on this below), we do 
not accept that they can be contextually cancelled the way that conversational implicatures 
can. We agree with Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet’s (1990, 314-5) diagnosis of these cases: 
the presuppositions are (semantically speaking) still there; the speaker rhetorically uses 
uttering their almost direct contradiction for the purposes of pragmatically challenging and 
eventually changing contextual assumptions. 
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(11) ?# I have no idea whether Chelsea won the cup, but surely you celebrated long into 
the night. 
This data can be taken to support the error/ignorance invariantist proposal canvassed in 
the previous section to characterize the assumptions that our most immediate, less reflective 
linguistic intuitions about taste predicates manifest. While López de Sa assumes a 
descriptivist interpretation of the relationalist ontology and the indexical contextualism that 
goes with it, on this proposal the disagreement data evinces invariantist pre-reflective folk 
assumptions. It is hence not surprising that such folk intuitions do not reveal the 
presuppositions of commonality that López de Sa’s account posits.  
Baker (2011, sec. 4) considers this response and presents two objections. First, he 
objects that it is not an advisable view on general methodological grounds. Secondly, he 
suggests that there might be a tension between arguing for contextualism and positing 
semantic ignorance (because the evidence for contextualism would suggest semantic 
enlightenment). Against the latter point, we have indicated in the previous section that 
relationalist claims of the sort we defend are based on data that in no way informs our most 
immediate intuitions. Along the history of philosophy, claims that some properties are 
secondary have typically been presented as somehow revisionary, even when based on 
evidence that ordinary folks are in a position to acquire. Against the former, we have already 
indicated why this form of error/ignorance is not methodologically catastrophic. The 
relationalist account offers real, actually instantiated properties with respect to which many 
folk claims are good approximations to the truth. 
Let us take stock. The best ontology for the properties expressed by taste predicates is a 
relationalist one, and the best semantics that goes with it is contextualist. On these 
assumptions, there is no doxastic disagreement in Noma1. An explanation for why people 
feel otherwise is that they are semantically deluded, assuming that predicates express 
properties such as (put from our enlightened perspective) tasty for one under proper 
conditions of appreciation. This also explains why usual tests do not detect the presence of 
the presuppositions. In the next section, we argue that this set of views, which we find 




4. Enlightened Impressions of Disagreement  
 
In this section, we address what we take to be the main problem with López de Sa’s 
proposal, beyond the one that Baker discusses. We will present it by considering the related 
case of gradable adjectives, for which Richard (2004) advances a relativist account.19  
Examples such as (12) and (13) below suggest the indexicality of gradable adjectives – 
adjectives that admit the comparative and superlative degrees, intensifiers like ‘much’ and 
‘very’, and so on: 
(12) (A, assuming Yasser is 1,96 m tall, discussing the height of basketball players): 
Yasser is short. 
(13) (B, assuming the same about Yasser, discussing the height of Moroccans): Yasser is 
not short. 
The information about differential standards of shortness which accounts for the intuition 
that different contents are being affirmed and denied in (12) and (13), provided by context in 
those examples, can in some other cases be explicitly articulated in the uttered sentence: 
(14) (A, as before): Yasser is short for a basketball player. 
(15) (B, as before): Yasser is not short for a Moroccan. 
This evidence can be handled by means of a contextualist proposal, following suggestions 
about the semantics of gradable adjectives in the literature such as Kennedy & McNally 
(2005). On a version of this view, ‘short’ denotes a measure function – a function from 
objects to degrees on a scale (in this case, of height), itself an ordering of degrees. This 
allows a natural account of the truth conditions of comparative claims like ‘Chicago is larger 
than Rome’. ‘More’ (or the corresponding suffix) is interpreted so that the sentence is true 
just in case the degree that the interpretation of the adjective ascribes to the interpretation of 
‘Chicago’ exceeds the degree that it ascribes to the interpretation of the phrase headed by 
‘than’. Similarly natural truth-conditions are given for sentences such as ‘John is 2 m tall’ and 
‘Chicago is very large’. To deal with the positive form of the adjective, the account posits an 
absolute morpheme in the syntax of a sentence such as (12), which combines with the 
measure function denoted by ‘short’ to yield a function from individuals to truth-values. The 
function takes an individual x to the true just in case the degree of height of that individual is 
                                                
19 García-Carpintero (2008) criticizes it, along lines summarized below. 
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at least as great as the average degree for the reference class, contextually given or, in (14)-
(15), made explicit by the ‘for a SN’ PP. 
On this contextualist view, the content of the predicate ‘is rich’ in an utterance of ‘A is rich 
(for an N)’ divides the domain (in any possible world) into two mutually incompatible and 
jointly exhaustive classes. How this divide is brought about depends on how the line in the 
scale of degrees of height is contextually drawn, i.e., on what counts as greater than the 
average for the N in the context.20 Now, ordinary speakers have impressions of 
disagreement in analogues of Noma1, which Richard (2004, 225) discusses, advancing an 
alternative truth-relativist theory.21 He suggest that the truth-evaluation of assertions such as 
(12) is relativized to “contexts of evaluation” providing different standards of precision, “ways 
of drawing the line”. Thus, to return to our example, consider that C replies with (16) to A in 
(12), aware that the height of basketball players is discussed, because he has a different 
very precise perspective on how to draw the line of height for players, which has led him to 
draw the line for shortness at 1,956 meters.  
(16) (C, assuming the same about Yasser as A): Yasser is not short. 
The most immediate impressions of ordinary speakers signal that a disagreement 
between A and C has been expressed. In order to appeal here to López de Sa’s proposal, 
we would posit “presuppositions of commonality” concerning how to draw the line for ‘short 
(for a basketball player)’. The account of the perception of disagreement is then that, in 
felicitous contexts where the presupposition is fulfilled, there would indeed be a 
straightforward disagreement between A and C. But the three tests suggest that such 
presuppositions are not present:  
(17) A: Yasser is short 
                                                
20 See Kennedy (2007) for an interesting and detailed elaboration of Graff’s (2000) 
epistemicist view to deal with the vagueness of gradable adjectives. We prefer 
supervaluationist accounts, but we are putting aside issues of vagueness for our purposes 
here. 
21 Egan, Hawthorne, & Weatherson (2005, 150) defend a similar view. Richard in fact 
distinguishes two kinds of context-dependence for gradable adjectives: the one to a 
reference class, which lends itself to a contextualist treatment, and a different one to “ways of 
drawing the line” in the given class. We do not need to go into this for present purposes. 
18 
C: #? Hey, wait a minute, I had no idea that we shared standards of precision for 
‘short’. 
(18) A: ? Yasser is short; and what is more, we share standards of precision for ‘short’. 
(19) A: ? I have no idea whether we share standards of precision for ‘short’, but Yasser is 
short.  
Once more, an alternative explanation for the intuitions can perhaps be provided in terms 
of error/ignorance: the content-relativity to “ways of drawing the line” in a given class is not 
manifest to ordinary intuitions.22 Be it as it may, we can ask: will the semantically 
enlightened (by which we mean those aware of the data, embracing a semantic explanation 
along contextualist lines, even if in broad outlines) still have impressions of disagreement, 
and, if so, could (the analogue of) López de Sa’s proposal account for them? With many 
writers – even some otherwise sympathetic to relativism – we think that the relevant 
judgment of disagreement (i.e., the perception that both parties cannot be right) simply 
vanishes, once the semantic situation has been made clear.23 A might well correctly react to 
(16) thus: 
(20) (A reacting to C’s assertion): That does not contradict what I said; I was just saying 
that Yasser is short for a basketball player on rough estimates for the purposes of 
coffee talk. I was not contemplating your own estimate; thus I was not wrong. 
In the previous section we assumed an account of presuppositions in the Stalnakerian 
tradition, on which speech acts are made in a context constituted by a set of propositions 
taken to be “common ground”, and presuppositions are requirements on that set. In this 
                                                
22 As a referee pointed out, another explanation is that the presupposition is stated in a 
complicated technical jargon including metalinguistic references. Note, however, that a 
similar point can be made regarding the previous cases (4)-(8). Presuppositions are taken to 
be common knowledge, so López de Sa is committed to their being somehow accessible to 
speakers. In any case, as it will transpire, our interest in this section has to do with the 
responses of “enlightened” speakers, capable of understanding the semantic proposals. 
23 Cf. Stanley (2005, 55-6) and Schaffer (2011, 212-6). Hawthorne (2004, 104-7) appears to 
concur that the appeal to intuitions of disagreement can be resisted in this way. MacFarlane 
(2005, 214-5 fn) also agrees. 
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tradition, assertion is understood as a proposal to update the common ground. On this view, 
given contextualist assumptions about the semantics of gradable adjectives, the presence of 
presuppositions of commonality about where to draw the line follows from general 
requirements of rationality ensuing from this conception of assertion, which Stalnaker (1978, 
88-92) articulates.24 The Baker-like intuitions in (17)-(19) might simply reflect the folk 
semantic ignorance. We submit that enlightened speakers will either simply lack them, or 
reject them as Müller-Lyer like illusions ensuing from an unenlightened competence, the way 
A does in (20). 
Now, we have cautiously qualified as “relevant” the judgments of disagreement we take to 
vanish on becoming semantically enlightened, because one might nonetheless still perceive 
some disagreement between A and C. A proposal along the lines of López de Sa’s might 
contribute to explain such perception in some cases. García-Carpintero (2008) offers a 
related alternative “metalinguistic” explanation of the remaining impression of disagreement. 
It goes as follows. Barker (2002) points out that sentences such as ‘Yasser is short’ could be 
used in contexts in which Yasser’s height is common knowledge, in reply to a question about 
what counts as being tall in such a context. These “metalinguistic uses”, as Barker calls 
them, are intended to provide information about the contextual standards of precision for 
‘short’. This is complementary to López de Sa’s proposal, in that the goal might be to secure 
that “commonality presuppositions” are in place. Similar uses of ‘Yasser is short’ might be 
intended instead as an invitation for conversational participants to fix the contextual standard 
of precision along the lines of the speaker’s, by accommodating its presupposed standards 
of precision.25  
                                                
24 Presuppositions of commonality thus have in this case a pragmatic source, not one in the 
lexical properties of the relevant expressions. 
25 Richard (2004, 226) makes a similar proposal in reply to what we take to be the central 
objection to assessment-relativism we mentioned above (cf. Marques 2014b). As our 
discussion shows, by themselves these alternative interpretations of assertions are 
compatible with contextualist and relativist proposals; we do not think they offer a sufficient 
response to the challenge for assertion-relativists, but we are not focusing on this here. 
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Mutatis mutandis, we can understand a negative reply, ‘Yasser is not short’, as a refusal 
to accommodate, sticking to alternative standards.26 These are uses of negation with some 
of the features of the phenomenon that Horn’s (1989) characterizes as “metalinguistic 
negation”.27 This is a pragmatic form of objecting to different aspects of a statement 
(presuppositions, implicatures, even intonation or pronunciation), without necessarily 
objecting to its content: ‘I do not have a car, I have a Ferrari’. Hence our caution before: the 
two complementary proposals we have contemplated to account for a remaining sense of 
disagreement among semantically enlightened speakers – López de Sa’s, and something 
akin to metalinguistic negation – are not intended to capture an impression of doxastic 
disagreement, on which both parties cannot be right about the semantic content at stake.28 
We have already claimed that any such impression would vanish under enlightenment.  
                                                
26 Richard (2004, 221-2) considers and rejects this “metalinguistic” account of the 
disagreement. He has three objections. (i) The parties need not be part of the same 
conversation. López de Sa (2008, 307) has a good reply: in perceiving the disagreement 
along the lines that the proposal suggests, we are imagining the subjects as being part of a 
common conversation. (ii) The proposal does not capture the phenomenology of speakers, 
who would not think of themselves to be sharpening indeterminate usage. But, while this 
might be right about the phenomenology accompanying pre-reflective impressions, we are 
only considering remaining impressions of disagreement among the enlightened. The final 
objection is that the proposal does not capture any disagreement in the fundamental sense 
(on which one party affirms and the other denies the semantic content of the utterances). 
This we grant, but it begs the question simply to insist that there remains some such 
disagreement to account for. 
27 Cf. Carston (1998) illuminating discussion.  
28 Sundell (2011) rejects the disagreement-based arguments against contextualist accounts 
along lines we find congenial: both intuitive impressions of disagreement, and disagreement 
indicated by uses of linguistic denial, are compatible with absence of some forms of doxastic 
disagreement – in which what one party asserts contradicts what the other asserts. He in fact 
illustrates this with Barker’s metalinguistic uses of gradable adjectives. He (2011, 276n and 
279n; cf. also Plunkett & Sundell (2013)) provides good reasons that the relevant cases differ 
significantly from paradigm examples of metalinguistic negation.  
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Now, this is precisely what we take to be the main objection to López de Sa’s proposal (of 
which he is well aware, cf. López de Sa 2008, 307-8).29 Once it is clear that an apparent 
doxastic disagreement is explained by mistakes about contextual presuppositions, the 
impression of disagreement vanishes. Thus, imagine that A asserts ‘he is Scottish’ because 
she takes a visible male to be the salient one referred by ‘he’ in that context, and B objects 
‘he is not Scottish’ because she rather takes the salient one to be the person the previous 
discourse was about. The relevant impression of disagreement would vanish when the non-
alignment of their referential presuppositions is made clear. A disagreement about a 
“metalinguistic proposition” expressible with A’s utterance (concerning who is the salient 
male in the context, and thus the referent of ‘he’) might still remain, specially if participants 
have common knowledge about the nationalities of the visible male and the one previously 
spoken about, and B places a proper emphasis on her token of ‘he’. B’s objection would be 
similar to the one metalinguistically expressed with ‘he is not Scottish, because he is not the 
person we were speaking about’, with the proper intonation on the first token of ‘he’ if 
required to make the interpretation clearer.  
Nevertheless, there is another form of disagreement present in cases like Noma1, which 
has not yet been accounted for. The case for relativism ultimately rests on the persistency of 
the impression of disagreement, which we grant exists, even under enlightenment about the 
relativity to standards of the denoted properties, the significant difference in the standards at 
stake, and the absence of an explicit intention of making a conflicting metalinguistic claim.30 
                                                
29 López de Sa (forthcoming) indicates that he agrees with us that there is a form of 
disagreement that cannot be explained by his proposal, because it remains among the 
enlightened when it is manifest that the context does not meet presuppositions of 
commonality, while it goes away in analogous cases such as that of gradable adjectives. He 
also agrees with us that such remaining disagreement is to be explained along practical 
lines, perhaps like those discussed in the next section. His paper clarifies that the discussion 
in López de Sa (2008, 307-8) was not an attempt to explain correct impressions of 
disagreement (impressions that do track some disagreement), but merely disagreement 
expressible in the “it is tasty – no, it isn’t” format. 
30 We agree that it is the intuitions of ordinary speakers that provide fundamental pieces of 
evidence for linguistic theorizing, as an anonymous referee pointed out. We think, however, 
that differences in impressions of disagreement among more theoretically articulated 
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To sum up, intuitions of disagreement do not call for any truth-relativization. Pre-reflective 
impressions that speakers cannot both be right do not have theoretical authority, and vanish 
among the enlightened: what one asserts and the other denies are independent claims. 
There might remain a “metalinguistic” disagreement, but this is irrelevant for the debate 
confronting contextualists and truth-relativists, because the former can easily accommodate 
it. Nevertheless, we think that a full account of disagreements involving taste predicates as in 
Noma1 has not yet been given. We plan to point to what is missing in the next section.  
 
 
5. Presupposit ions of Commonali ty and Coordination Problems  
 
Let us then go back to impressions of disagreement among the enlightened regarding the 
cases on which we are focusing, predicates of taste. As we just said, we feel that those 
impressions remain, and that neither the metalinguistic nor the presuppositional accounts by 
themselves do them full justice. We want to account for them by appealing to a distinction 
Stevenson (1963, 1-2) makes between “disagreement in belief” and “disagreement in 
attitude”. 
 Given that beliefs are attitudes too, we will speak of doxastic disagreement and 
disagreement in pro-attitudes, which corresponds very roughly to what Stevenson has in 
mind, “any psychological disposition of being for or against something … love and hate are 
relatively specific kinds of attitudes, as are approval and disapproval, and so on”. What 
Stevenson refers to with “disagreement in belief” corresponds, also roughly, to the notion of 
doxastic disagreement we have described in the introduction: the relation between two 
agents that holds when they cannot both be right about something. We believe that what 
explains the residual impression of disagreement among the enlightened is that 
disagreements about taste are, often, partly non-doxastic. We cannot offer a full account of 
non-doxastic disagreement here, but we will offer a brief explanation. 
Let us look again at the disagreement between enlightened subjects in Noma1: 
Noma1 A: Noma is a better restaurant than Mugaritz. 
                                                                                                                                                   
speakers concerning cases like Noma1 and cases involving gradable adjectives or 
demonstratives might also manifest interesting semantic differences in the cases, also 
meriting explanation.  
23 
 B: Noma is not a better restaurant than Mugaritz; Mugaritz is better. 
The resilient disagreement that remains between A and B cannot be doxastic, as 
described here. If what they assert counted as a doxastic disagreement, then either A would 
be absolutely right about Noma’s quality, or B would be absolutely right, but not both. At first 
sight A and B hold a dispute about the relative quality of two restaurants along a particular 
value scale for gourmet restaurants. Since A and B are enlightened experts, they realize that 
they do not share the same value scale, i.e., they do not presuppose that they share a 
common standard. We are assuming here a relational dispositional account of value (as 
illustrated in section 2, by analogy with the case of color). On this understanding of values, A 
states that Noma is the restaurant favored by subjects of a certain kind (A’s kind, 
presumably) in circumstances C, and B states that Mugaritz is favored by subjects of a 
certain kind (B’s kind) in circumstances C. We, A and B know that each kind of person favors 
different kinds of restaurants.  
Notice here that if the dispositional account of value required only the self-ascription of a 
de se disposition (the speaker’s self-ascription of the disposition to favor such and such kinds 
of restaurants, say), then we still would not have a doxastic disagreement, since each 
speaker is presumably right (qua expert) to self-ascribe the disposition to favor one 
restaurant.  
The possibility that enlightened speakers continue to discuss, even though they realize 
that they are differently disposed towards restaurants, because they are attempting to 
negotiate a common or shared standard, is thus plausible. The question that arises when we 
realize that speakers may engage in metalinguistic negotiations as to what response is 
adequate is this: why do people try to converge on a common response, and enter into 
conflicts when this does not occur? 
Like other authors, we submit that what remains is a non-doxastic disagreement or 
conflict, and that such a conflict of attitudes is what drives negotiations and disputes over the 
selection of standards. The alternative notion of disagreement we are contemplating is a 
conflict of pro-attitudes.31 But it is one thing to point towards conflicting pro-attitudes, it is 
another to explain why pro-attitudes conflict. Invoking Lewis’s (1989) distinction between 
desiring alike and agreeing in desire, we can appreciate that the fact that two people have 
                                                
31 Egan (2010), Sundell (2011) and Huvenes (2012) also appeal to conflicts of non-doxastic 
attitudes to explain resilient impressions of disagreement over aesthetic or taste evaluations. 
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different desires and dispositions by itself does not amount to a conflict of pro-attitudes. 
There are cases where people desire alike and are in conflict: for instance, two people who 
both desire to have the last piece of cake desire alike, but are in conflict. And there are cases 
of people who do not desire alike and are not in conflict: for instance, if one desires to have 
the last piece of cake and the other could not eat any more cake. This indicates that having 
different desires is not a necessary condition of conflicting attitudes.  
 Our suggestion is that, as Lewis indicated, it is the preclusion of joint satisfaction (at the 
same world) that amounts to a conflict of desires. However, a problem with disagreement in 
desires in this sense is that, for instance in Noma1, the fact that A and B individually have 
different dispositions and desires towards food does not preclude the satisfaction of their 
desires at the same world. If they disagree in desires, it must be because what is desired 
precludes satisfaction. This requires that we rethink the content of the desires. Note that A 
and B cannot both be satisfied at the same world if the relevant desires are about them 
collectively: A desires that we find Noma a better restaurant, B desires that we find Mugaritz 
a better restaurant. Their desires would not be de se, but de nobis (as we might call them, by 
analogy with the individual case). If A’s desire is satisfied, then they both find Noma the best 
restaurant. If B’s desire is satisfied, then they both find Mugaritz the best restaurant. If A finds 
Noma the best, and B finds Mugaritz the best, they disagree in desires, since it is not the 
case that “exactly the same world” satisfies them. 
It was not the focus of this paper to explain why we have such de nobis desires and 
dispositions. We offer nonetheless some support for the hypothesis below. The suggestion is 
that in specific cases involving evaluations, we tend to use the invariant form ‘x is better than 
y’ because we assume that others share the same dispositions. It may turn out that that is 
not the case, and nonetheless there is the perception, we grant, that there is a resilient sense 
of disagreement. The present suggestion is that people desire that others respond in similar 
ways (in some specific kinds of cases).  
In a similar vein, several authors claim that first-person plural intentions, i.e., intentions in 
the we-mode, play a fundamental role in interaction, cooperation and shared agency. 
Recently, for example, Gallotti & Frith (2012), in the context of considering the role of 
collective intentionality in group agency and interpersonal understanding, propose that 
“individuals engaged in joint action have a broader understanding of the behavior of their 
partners, and thus of options available for action, by representing aspects of the interactive 
scene in the we-mode”. (p. 161) Gallotti & Frith defend that interacting agents represent their 
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contributions to joint action as contributions to something that they are going to pursue 
together, as a ‘we’.  
Bacharach (2006) and Gold & Sudgen (2007) have argued that decision-theoretic 
reasoning irreducibly involving a group with which agents identify (typically by expressing 
their attitudes with an irreducibly first-personal ‘we’) is needed to account for human's 
distinguishing tendency to cooperation. This is manifested in actual behaviour in, and 
normative judgment about, situations game-theoretically modelled by schemas such as Hi-
Lo, Stag/Rabbit Hunting, Battle-of-the-Sexes, and, most famously, the Prisoner's Dilemma. 
Thus, in Hi-Lo players have to choose one of two labels, A and B; if they both choose A, they 
get 100€; if they both choose B, they both get 10€; otherwise, they get nothing. Outcomes 
<A, A> and <B, B> are both Nash equilibria (a sequence of strategies, one for each player, 
such that it is optimal for each player to follow the corresponding strategy in the sequence, 
given that the other players follow theirs). As Bacharach (2006, 44-7) shows, on ordinary 
decision-theoretic assumptions about subjective rationality, it cannot be explained why the 
former should be preferred to the latter. Both Bacharach and Gold & Sudgen show how 
“team thinking” (reasoning concerning what we should do) assuming group identification 
deals with this problem (and the other game-theoretical situations previously mentioned) in 
agreement with our intuitions and practice.32 
Recent work on shared agency and on the rationality of team reasoning posit, then, 
attitudes about us, i.e., about a group with which an agent identifies. We may call these de 
nobis intentions. The present suggestion extends these de nobis attitudes to desires and 
dispositions. Just like collective de nobis intentions play a role in the explanation of shared 
agency and cooperation, de nobis desires can be presumed to play a similar explanatory 
role. The explanatory hypothesis is that having de nobis desires are conducive to the 
coordination of behaviour towards common goals.33 As an illustration, in Noma1, A and B as 
expert food critics may have the common goal of preparing the rank of the world’s 50 best 
                                                
32 Gilbert (2009) advocates the irreducibility of the collective attitudes of joint commitment 
supporting team thinking, questioning proposals by other writers such as Bratman (1993); 
see Ludwig (2007) and List & Pettit (2010) for two opposing recent discussions. We do not 
need to commit ourselves here to the irreducibility of team thinking. 
33 These shared desires are shared values, along the lines suggested by Bratman (2004): 
shared policies for treating the relevant features as reasons in joint deliberations. 
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restaurants, and hence it is relevant that they come to have the same, or at least converging, 
preferences. 
Note however that this is a simplified caricature of the view. We cannot expect that, as a 
matter of fact, whenever two people have conflicting dispositions, preferences or desires, 
then they have a specific common goal that requires the coordination of their actions. 
Moreover, it may be unclear what group the relevant group is, i.e., who we are. The 
hypothesis about why we have de nobis desires should then dig deeper than the sketch 
suggests. We should look into the work of evolutionary psychologists to support the 
explanatory hypothesis: we have these collective attitudes because this has proved 
evolutionarily advantageous, as Tooby and Cosmides (2010), for instance, claim. According 
to them, alliances pose a series of adaptive problems, where the two main ones are the 
problem of free riders and the problem of coordination: “gravitation towards common 
evaluations” and “aversion to dissonance in groups” are evolved systems of coordination that 
respond to evolutionarily recurrent situations, for example contamination or nourishment.34 
As to the second problem, who ‘we’ are, we defer to Lewis. By default, we tend to assume 
that ‘we’ is everyone else (sufficiently similar, in some fundamental respect, to the speaker). 
Beyond this, “we wait and see”: 
In making a judgment of value, one makes many claims at once, some 
stronger than others, some less confidently than others, and waits to see 
which can be made to stick. . . How much am I claiming? – as much as I can 
get away with. . . What I mean to commit myself to is conditionally relative: 
relative if need be, but absolute otherwise. (Lewis, 1979b, 85). 
Our hypothesis about the attitudinal disagreements about taste is in sum as follows. 
Presuppositions of commonality constitute joint commitments manifesting group identification 
                                                
34 As they put it, “. . . there seems to be a psychophysics of mutual coordination and 
coregistration. . . The benefits of coregistration and mental coordination can explain. . . an 
appetite for coexperiencing (watching events is more pleasurable with friends and allies), the 
motivation to share news with others, for emotional contagion, for gravitation in groups 
toward common evaluations, for aversion to dissonance in groups, for conformity, for mutual 
arousal to action as with mobs (payoffs shift when others are coordinated with you), and so 
on” (Tooby and Cosmides, 2010, 250). 
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of the kind the authors mentioned above posit, which might result in coordinated action with 
respect to an indefinite plurality of projects. Put in a simple-minded way, by judging in the 
way she expresses in Noma1, A manifests to be prepared (in a felicitous context where the 
commonality presuppositions are indeed part of the common ground) to endorse directives 
such as: let us promote more Noma-eating, even at the expense of Mugaritz-eating!35 The 
core of the attitudinal agreement between participants in such a conversation (or between a 
thinker and others sharing her views) lies in their sharing those de nobis collective 
preferences. 
Explicit indication that the presuppositions fail, as in the metalinguistic reading of 
expressions of disagreement in such cases, manifests the absence of such preferences – of 
such collective dispositions. This is missing in other semantically similar cases, such as the 
disagreement about being rich.36 In a nutshell, people who converge in their collective de 
nobis dispositions have a non-doxastic agreement: they agree in their collective desires. This 
agreement inclines them to coordinate their actions toward an indefinite plurality of related 
projects, by sharing preferences of the kind just mentioned. People in non-doxastic 
disagreement (who disagree in desires) have dispositions that may be obstacles to the 
coordination of their actions.  
Both Huvenes (2012) and Sundell (2011) point out that people may use markers of 
disagreement even in cases in which it is manifest to them that they are not in doxastic 
disagreement:  “I like this chilli” – “I disagree/Nuh-uh/No, it is too hot”. This shows that there 
is no immediate argument from disagreement against contextualism. Huvenes suggests an 
                                                
35 This is to add a collective, group-involving twist to expressivist themes; but one does not 
need to subscribe expressivism to justify the move, other forms of motivational internalism 
(such as the one advanced by Wedgwood (2007)) will do, adding the collectivist twist. 
36 It might also be present there, for instance if we are discussing tax obligations; our 
prediction is that a lingering impression of disagreement will be then felt in such cases. It 
should be clear that we are only aiming to account for some remaining impressions of 
disagreement, which we think are more easily felt in cases involving predicates of taste than 
in cases involving ‘rich’. Impressions of disagreement might simply evaporate in the former 
cases among the enlightened; and some may remain in the latter cases, ascribable to 
practical aspects too. 
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account in terms of non-doxastic disagreement, as we have done. We try to go a bit further 
than he does in suggesting how to elaborate the nature of the non-doxastic disagreement.  
To conclude, we hope to have made clear both the complexity of the issues and the 
plurality of resources available in order to deal with them to a sensible form of contextualism. 
Relativists do not do justice to a good portion of the data (as pointed out by Cappelen & 
Hawthorne (2009, 122-6) and Schaffer (2011, 220-3)). They mostly ignore the generic and 
dispositional elements in an adequate form of contextualism, the distinction between pre-
reflective and enlightened intuitions, metalinguistic disagreements, and the rich role of non-
doxastic and practical aspects.37 When the problems incurred by the more radical and 
interesting variety of relativism – assessor relativism – are added to the balance, the verdict 
is, we think, clear. 
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37 Egan (2010) is again an exception. At the end of the day his criticism of the form of 
contextualism we have defended is that “it makes the wrong predictions about what we 
should do when the presupposition of similarity fails. On the sort of contextualist proposal 
[…], once the presupposition of similarity fails, it should be clear that we are in a situation 
where the parties to the dispute are simply talking past one another, and their assertions are 
not really in conflict. […] But this seems wrong. The right reaction to the failure of the 
presupposition of similarity is not for each party just happily to accept the other's assertion. 
The right reaction is to stop asserting those sentences” (op. cit., 283). As we have pointed 
out, however, on the one hand folk intuitions are not consistent with what Egan takes to be 
the right reaction. On the other hand, disagreements about matters of taste involve de nobis 
dispositions and desires, and the failure of a presupposition of commonality is a possible 
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